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SUMMARY 
The Apollo lunar surface experiments package ground-support system and the 
Manned Space Flight Network a r e  described functionally, A suspected design problem 
concerning the experiments package/network interface is discussed. It was  learned 
that analysis of the data-communications interface problem was  most feasible by the 
application of modeling techniques. The data-handling conventions of the Manned 
Space Flight Network communications system are discussed, and the embedding of 
these conventions in a general -purpose simulation -system network model is described. 
The model was run using anticipated network traffic loads for a lunar-landing mission 
and extensive data-traffic statistics. The results of the network simulation confirmed 
the suspected data-handling problems and suggested alternative solutions. The 
validity of the simulation results and of the implemented solution was  confirmed 
by postmission analysis of the logged data traffic. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 1968, the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) (for- 
merly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)) w a s  charged with the real-time data 
acquisition, command, and control of the Apollo lunar surface experiments packages 
that were to be emplaced on the lunar surface during the lunar explorations. The 
(ALSEP) program were considerably different from those previously encountered in 
the support of manned missions. Some of the unique ALSEP support requirements are 
stated in the following paragraphs. 
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support requirements necessitated by the Apollo lunar surface experiments package 
I '  
Sustained, continuous support was required for long mission phases. Each 
ALSEP required 45 days of continuous support after deployment on the lunar surface, 
2 .5  days of continuous support after each terminator crossing (lunar sunrise and sun- 
set), and 2 hours of support per Earth day. Because each ALSEP had a projected 
lifetime of 1 to 2 years ,  multiple mission support w a s  also required. 
duration, long -term support requirements had to be contrasted to the relatively 
short-duration manned missions (8 to 9 days for Apollo missions) for which the MSC 
Mission Control Center (MCC) was intended. 
These long- 
A high degree of support-system reliability was not required for ALSEP 
support, and data-system redundancy was not required, Restoration of failed systems 
had to be accomplished only within 2 hours, The rather modest system reliability and 
availability requirements for the ALSEP support were relaxed considerably from the 
severe requirements placed on manned-mission support systems; for example, the 
real-time computer complex (RTCC) required the attainment of a reliability (proba- 
bility of zero failures) goal of 0.9995 for the critical phases of Apollo missions. 
Support of the ALSEP did not require large support systems comparable to the 
scale of the MCC Apollo systems. Processor  sizing estimates indicated that a 
medium -scale computer system would meet communications and data -processing r e  - 
quirements. The MCC Apollo system involved the use of a Univac 494 as a communica- 
tions processor and an IBM 360/75 as a real-time data processor; both of these were 
large -scale computer systems. 
An MCC ALSEP support system that was independent of but compatible with the 
Apollo systems was  necessary because of the requirements that the ALSEP have sus-  
tained support, minimal reliability, and moderate processing; that the ALSEP support 
have minimal effect on Apollo support; and that the ALSEP systems be as compatible 
as possible with existing systems. Not only would the compatibility of the ALSEP and 
Qpollo support systems facilitate necessary human and equipment interfaces with 
existing systems, but systems compatibility also would allow the same hardware and 
software technology used in Apollo support to be used in the design and implementation 
of the ALSEP support system. 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The resulting ALSEP support system used a medium -scale general-purpose 
computer system (an IBM 360/50) as a combined communications and real-time data 
processor. Early in the design stages of the ALSEP support system, it was  recognized 
that maximum and efficient use of the MCC resources  would result  if the ALSEP could 
be supported by the existing large -scale IBM 360/75 computer systems constituting 
the RTCC. Initially, the following basic factors precluded using an IBM 360/75 to 
support the ALSEP. 
1. At that time, Apollo and ALSEP development, testing, and simulations re- 
quired all available computing resources ,  including the IBM 360/50 computer 
supporting the ALSEP. 
2. Efficient use of the IBM 360/75 computer in support of ALSEP required the 
final development and checkout of a multijobbing real-time operating system So that the 
excess  capacity of the IBM 360/75 supporting the ALSEP could be used for  other tasks. 
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The requirements of reduced computing -resource needs and development of a 
multijobbing real-time operating system were met by the time of the first successful 
lunar landing (Apollo 11). Consequently, ALSEP support was relocated to the RTCC 
during the first lunar night after deployment of the early Apollo scientific experiments 
package, a reduced version of ALSEP. It should be noted that the eventual use of an 
IBM 360/75 rather  than an IBM 360/50 computer had no functional effect on the ALSEP 
support system. In fact, even the programing system w a s  completely compatible with 
either machine. 
The ALSEP computer provided the necessary interfaces and processing capability 
to accept, format, process, and transmit ALSEP telemetry, command, display, and 
control data. After being telemetered from the lunar surface, all ALSEP telemetry 
data were sent directly from the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) through the 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) to the MCC data links. This mode of opera- 
tion allowed the ALSEP support system to function without dependence on the commu- 
nications processors  at the MCC. The ALSEP command and control data were received 
from the ALSEP display/control subsystem. Then, the commands were verified and 
forwarded to the ALSEP directly through the MSFN interface or, if  the Apollo systems 
also were using the network, through the MCC communications processors  to the net- 
work and, ultimately, to the ALSEP. Control data were used to select display formats, 
to control ALSEP telemetry s t ream selection, and, in general, to control the ALSEP 
computer processing. The ALSEP display data were transmitted by the ALSEP com- 
puter, under display control, to the ALSEP display/control subsystem. Display data 
consisted of data for the ALSEP high-speed line printer; digital data for digital event 
indications; and analog data for seismic drum recorders ,  analog strip-chart recorders ,  
and analog meter displays. The ALSEP support system and its relation to Apollo sup- 
port systems in the MCC are shown in figure 1. 
A s  can be seen in figure 1, the goal of an  independent ALSEP support system at 
the MCC was met by implementing a modest (by Apollo standards ) facility to be 
operated in parallel with the existing Apollo systems. However, both the ALSEP and 
Apollo systems required an interface with and used the MSFN for data communications 
and command traffic. The design and implementation of the ALSEP interface with the 
MSFN was a critical step in the evolution of the ALSEP support system. 
1 
~~ 
The MCC communications processing facility (communications, command, and 1 
telemetry system) was composed of three Univac 494 computers, and the real-time 
processing facility (the RTCC) was composed of five IBM 360/75 computers. 
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A contradiction in requirements was 
encountered when the functional design of 
the ALSEP interface with the MSF" was 
initiated. Redundancy of the ALSEP sup- 
whereas the compatibility of ALSEP sup- 
was required. These superficially unrelated 
requirements conflicted because all network 
traffic was received by the MCC through re- 
dundant 50-kbps wide -band data circuits 
operating in a primary/alternate configura- 
tion. An interface with both wide-band 
circuits would have required redundant 
ALSEP interfacing equipment. Because the 
network interface equipment was required 
to provide message framing and e r r o r  -block 
encoding and decoding and to meet all data- 
s e t  and computer conventions, the cost for 
each interface unit was expected to be quite 
high. The "no redundancy" requirement 
could not, therefore, be taken lightly. 
3 port  systems was explicitly not required, 
port with existing ground-support systems 
I '  
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One possible solution to the network 
interface impasse would have involved the 
a manual switch to the alternate c i r -  
construction of a single interface unit with the capability to switch between the two 
data circuits. If the prime circuit should fail, 
cuit could be made. This approach would appear satisfactory because system failures 
required restoration within 2 hours. Certainly, loss  of data (failure) could be detected 
and a switch to the alternate circuit made within seconds or, at most, minutes. How- 
ever, one additional factor had to be considered. 
The second line of the two wide-band data circuits between the GSFC and the 
MCC was used not only as a backup in case the first line failed but also as an overflow 
line in case the data-carrying capacity of the first line was exceeded. Therefore, data 
loss  to the ALSEP facility would occur if ALSEP data overflowed to the alternate line 
while the interface unit was  connected to the primary line. However, an Apollo mission 
ground rule required that mission traffic always be limited to the capacity of a single 
line. 
short-term data rate exceeded the line capacity of 50 kbps while the long-term rate 
remained below 50 kbps. 
.i 
Assuming this ground rule was obeyed, overflow could be expected only when the 3 
t 
'Circuit failure was assumed when the message originator failed to receive a 
message acknowledgment from the receiver for  five consecutive 600-bit data blocks. 
Transmission would then switch automatically to the alternate circuit. 
4 
Because of a possibility of data loss, a study w a s  initiated to determine the 
probable severity of data overflow to the alternate circuit and, if  severe, to examine 
and recommend alternative courses of action. It should be noted that overflow could 
occur only during those periods when both Apollo and ALSEP data were being sent 
over the network; the ALSEP data alone could not precipitate data overflow. Moreover, 
if desired and if Apollo systems were not using the network, the data link between the 
GSFC and the MCC could be used in the "forced" mode; that is, by forcing all data 
over one circuit. 
NETWORK DESCR I PTI O N  
For the purposes of the analysis, the MSF" consisted of worldwide remote sites 
to acquire telemetry and trajectory data, 2.4-kbps data links to telemeter the digital 
data to the GSFC, communications processors at the GSFC to reformat and multiplex 
the data, and two 50-kbps wide-band data circuits to route the multiplexed data to the 
MCC. This data flow is illustrated in figure 1. 
The telemetry equipment at each remote si te was capable of transmitting 
two 2.4-kbps data s t reams continuously. Each 2400-bps data s t ream was formatted 
into 2400-bit blocks. The data rate and block size were fixed for each telemetry site 
and were not dependent on vehicle o r  mission. Each fixed remote site in high-speed 
tracking support produced ten 240-bit blocks/sec on a 2 .4  -kbps circuit. 
The GSFC communications processor transmitted the received remote -site 
high-speed data to the MCC through the wide-band data links at a data rate of 50 000 bps 
in 600-bit bursts. Each 600-bit block consisted of a 480-bit block, containing data or  
f i l l  (or both), and 120 bits of overhead. Therefore, five 600-bit blocks were required to 
support each remote-site telemetry s t ream (480 data bits/block X 5 blocks = 2400 bits). 
A maximum of two telemetry s t reams for each s i te  was possible. Each fixed tracking 
site required ten 600-bit blocks/sec to transmit the 10 incoming 240-bit blocks. A s  of 
the date of the analysis, no attempt had been made to pack two high-speed tracking 
formats  into one wide-band data format. 
Because the GSFC message -switching system was designed to "throughput" data 
with minimum delays, a 600-bit block was formatted as soon as 480 telemetry bits o r  
240 tracking bits were buffered from a remote site. This design implied the forma- 
tion of a 600-bit block every 200 milliseconds for each remote-site telemetry s t ream 
and every 100 milliseconds for each remote tracking site. 
Each of the two GSFC/ MCC wide-band data circuits used an output queue (a 
line of data blocks ready to be serviced) capable of queuing fifteen 600-bit wide-band 
data blocks. One circuit was designated the pr ime circuit and the other the alternate 
circuit. During normal operation, message transmission was on a "message 
rotary- pr imary/  overflow" basis. Therefore, messages were transmitted on the 
pr ime circuit  if  available and on the alternate (overflow) circuit if the pr ime circuit 
W a s  not available. Messages could consist of one or  more segments (600-bit blocks), 
and a message could not be split across  the two circuits. A telemetry message con- 
tained five segments, whereas a fixed-site trajectory message contained one segment. 
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The availability of a circuit was determined by the length of the output queue. On 
receipt of the first segment in each message, the count of the prime and alternate 
queues was compared and the message transmitted on the circuit with the shortest 
queue. If only one wide-band data circuit was made available (forced mode), the full 
15-segment queue was used with no possibility of overflow. Two additional segment 
buffers for  each queue were effectively "hidden, " however, f rom the routing logic. 
These hidden-segment buffers resulted from the double buffering of outgoing segments 
within the wide-band data-network interface units (Univac special polynomial terminal 
subsystem type 33/ 22) a t  GSFC. Actually, the hidden-segment buffers made the 
routing operate a s  i f  overflow could occur only after three segments were in the prime 
, queue instead of one. 
NETWORK TRAFFIC 
To perform a n  overflow analysis, a knowledge of the expected traffic to be 
handled by the network is required. Estimates for the worst-case network traffic 
during lunar-landing missions were four tracking sites with three two -line telemetry 
sites durjng lunar descent/ascent phases and three tracking s i tes  with four two-line 
telemetry si tes during launch phases. Remote -site support estimates of this magni- 
tude resulted in the following traffic-loading predictions for the GSFC/MCC wide -band 
data link. 
1. During descent/ascent phases: 40 segments/sec tracking and 30 segments/ 
s e c  telemetry, yielding 42 000 bps 
2. During launch phases: 30 segments/sec tracking and 40 segments/sec 
telemetry, again yielding 42 000 bps 
The ALSEP data load had to be added to the Apollo traffic. In support of ALSEP 
(a maximum of two ALSEP sites), each remote si te would contribute 5 segments/sec to 
the data-link traffic. Because the worst-case Apollo phases resulted in equal traffic, 
the aggregate anticipated worst-case loads on the GSFC/MCC wide -band data links 
were Apollo mission support with one ALSEP site (45 000. bps) and Apollo mission sup- 
port with two ALSEP sites (48 000 bps). Although the predicted traffic loads were with- 
in a single wide-band data-circuit capacity of 50 kbps, queuing of segments with 
subsequent data overflow could occur if the segment arr ivals  to the circuit queue were 
not spaced equally in time, This '%bunching in time" of segments was possible because 
the remote sites, which ultimately controlled segment generation, were not synchro - 
nized and could initiate a message start a t  any random time (random within a 1-second 
interval). 
C I R C U I T  OVERFLOW A N A L Y S I S  B Y  MODELING 
To obtain the probability of data overflow to the alternate wide-band circuit, the 
following three basic approaches were considered: a n  analytic probabilistic solution, 
an empirical solution obtained by actual network operation, and a modeling solution 
obtained by simulating the network. After the analytical approach was discarded as 
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being essentially insolvable without drastic simplification assumptions and after the 
empirical approach was discarded as being impractical because of the cost and the 
difficulty of operating a worldwide data-communications network for test  purposes, the 
simulation approach w a s  chosen. 
To simulate data-overflow conditions and to obtain statistics on overflow occur- 
rences, a network model was developed. The model was  driven by a variable number 
of telemetry and tracking sources corresponding to the remote sites. Each telemetry 
source was represented by the random generation of a message segment having a uni- 
form distribution on the interval from 0 to 1 second and of subsequent segments having 
a period of 200 milliseconds. Each five successive segments constituted one telemetry 
message. Each line of the two-line telemetry remote s i tes  was represented by a sep- 
arate telemetry source. Each tracking source was represented by the random genera- 
tion of a message segment having a uniform distribution on the interval from 0 to 
1 second and of subsequent segments having a period of 100 milliseconds. Each 
segment constituted one tracking message. 
The network model accepted each source segment and determined whether i t  was 
a "first of message" segment. If the segment was a "first" segment, the model 
checked the primary output queue count. If K (the queue-overflow level) or  fewer 
segments were in the primary queue, the message was assigned to the prime queue. 
If more than K segments were in the prime queue, the alternate queue count w a s  
checked and the message was assigned to the shortest queue. The factor K was  a 
variable. Each segment incremented the count of the queue to which it was assigned. 
Both queues decremented at the rate of once each 12  milliseconds (the transmission 
t ime of a 600-bit segment on the wide-band data links). The following statistics were 
to be collected from the model. 
1. Average length of queues 
2. Maximum length of queues 
3. Number of tracking segments sent to prime and alternate queues 
4. Number of telemetry segments sent to prime and alternate queues 
5. Number of ALSEP segments sent to pr ime and alternate queues (The ALSEP 
was treated as a single-line telemetry source. ) 
6. Total number of telemetry, tracking, and ALSEP segments generated 
7. Extent of pr ime and alternate circuit use 
MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION 
The network model was designed and implemented in the IBM general-purpose 
The model was fairly short, requiring approximately 100 GPSS 
simulation system (GPSS) language and was executed on the MCC IBM 360/50 and 
360/75 computers. 
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operations. A s  input parameters,  the model accepted the queue-overflow level K, the 
number of telemetry sources (for which each double-line telemetry source was treated 
as two telemetry sources), the number of tracking sources, and the number of ALSEP 
sources (treated as single -line telemetry sites), As output, the model automatically 
provided the maximum length of queues, the total number of segments sent to each 
queue, the use of wide-band data lines, the number of segments sent to each line, and 
the various queue and line statistics. In addition to the aggregate queue and line 
statistics, tables on the queue contents (both primary and alternate) were generated fo r  
telemetry, tracking, and ALSEP data. These tables indicated the number of segments 
in the primary o r  alternate queue awaiting transmission after each segment was  placed 
in the prime/alternate queue. This information allowed examination of the distribution 
of queue contents, 
were specified in integral numbers of seconds. 
The model time resolution was 1 millisecond, and the model runs 
To calibrate and test  the network model, several  predictable traffic -loading 
cases  were modeled. These cases  started telemetry, tracking, and ALSEP traffic at 
specified times (as contrasted to random times). Because the start t imes were the 
only random processes in the model, the results were predetermined and agreed with 
predictions, 
Because the traffic -source (telemetry, tracking, and ALSEP) start times were 
the only random variables in the model, network-traffic flow became periodic within 
1 second (period of telemetry and ALSEP messages). Because of the periodicity, each 
simulation randomly started all si tes,  collected data for 1 second, and repeated the 
process for the period of specified time. The "restart  each second" model allowed 
the maximum random variation of the traffic flow. Several cases  of traffic flow were 
simulated by varying the combinations of traffic sources and aggregate traffic loads. 
In addition, several cases with varying queue-overflow levels were modeled. The 
results of these runs a r e  summarized in table I. 
of two represented the model of the existing routing technique. A queue-overflow 
level of two was used because the previously mentioned double buffering of each 
network interface unit effectively resulted in two hidden-segment buffers in each 
queue. The "queue-overflow level" column of table I includes the two hidden buffers. 
I 
I 
Cases having a queue-overflow level 
~ 
Data overflow occurred in all cases  that were simulated with an overflow level 
of two, as seen in table I. Overflow continued a t  high traffic loads until the overflow 
level was increased to nine segments. It is interesting to note that the maximum 
difference between maximum queue contents with overflow levels of two and nine was 
only three segments, an indication of a minor segment time-delay difference between 
the different overflow levels. 
MODEL1 NG RESULTS 
With an overflow level of two segments, overflow of ALSEP data to the alternate 
line was deemed probable a t  anticipated traffic loads. This conclusion w a s  based on 
the observed high rate  of overflow shown by the simulation runs. The use of the prime 
line was fairly low (68 to 89 percent of capacity) on the runs with an overflow level Of 
two (table I), an indication of a high overflow rate.  An increase in  overflow level to 
five segments significantly reduced the overflow probability but did not eliminate it.  
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At an overflow level of nine segmerits, no data overflows occurred during all simula- 
tion runs with traffic loads below line capacity. This elimination of overflows occurred 
with a maximum increase of three queued segments over the cases  with an overflow 
level of two (from six to nine segments), It should be noted that an overflow is possible 
(but not probable) even with an overflow level of nine. Receipt of 10 segments within 
12 milliseconds would have caused an overflow at 30 kbps. 
Certain combinations of telemetry - and tracking -segment arr ival  t imes could 
have resulted in overflow, even though aggregate traffic loads were below line capacity 
and a high overflow level was used, Because the number of possible combinations of 
data-source arr ival  t imes ranged from 1021 to 
resolution and start times from 6 to 12 data sources uniformly distributed over 
1 second), an exhaustive examination of all possible combinations clearly was impossi - 
ble. Therefore, the model could randomly select only a small  sample of these combi- 
nations. Consequently, it w a s  cautioned that, although no overflows occurred with 
traffic loads below 48K with an overflow level of nine in the model runs, the proba- 
bility (apparently slight) did exist that overflow could occur. 
(assuming 1 -millisecond time 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The results of the network simulations indicated that a single Apollo lunar su r -  
face experiments package facility interface with the network would result  in data loss  
if the existing data-routing techniques were used. 
data-overflow problem seemed apparent. The first two proposed solutions, increasing 
the queue-overflow level to nine segments or  recognizing and force -routing all Apollo 
lunar surface experiments package data on the prime line, had to be eliminated because 
they would have required modifications to the routing programs at the Goddard Space 
Flight Center. 
changes was considered unacceptable. 
with network conventions and the implementation of functionally redundant network 
interface units, one unit for each of the two wide-band data circuits. 
Three alternative solutions to the 
The risk to Apollo missions that is inherent in any routing-program 
The remaining solution required compliance 
The implementation of two interface units was the course of action followed. 
validity of this solution was verified when, after the support of the Apollo 11 mission 
and the early Apollo scientific experiments package, examination of data log tapes 
indicated significant Apollo lunar surface experiments package data overflow to the 
alternate line. 
unit. 
The 
These data were, of course, received on the second network interface 
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